Janet Hamlin / AFP - Getty Images

This courtroom sketch shows alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as he holds up a piece of paper during a court recess at his hearing on Monday at the U.S. Navy base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Updated at 5:20 p.m. ET: The self-professed mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, which resulted in the deaths of 2,976 people, appeared before a military judge at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba on Monday after months of delays due to scheduling conflicts, religious observances, an Internet outage and a tropical storm.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed shocked some observers by appearing with a long, full beard that had been dyed bright reddish-orange. He appeared before Judge Army Col. James Pohl for the start of a week of pretrial hearings, along with co-defendants Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, a Pakistani; Mustafa Al Hawsawi, a Saudi; and Walid Bin Attash and Ramzi Binalshibh, two men from Yemen.

Unlike their last appearance in court in May, which was disrupted several times by the defendants, the five men sat quietly at the defense table, under the watchful eyes of military guards and several family members of the 9/11 victims, The Associated Press reported. All seemed to be cooperating with their attorneys. Mohammed read legal papers. Two others responded politely to the judge when they were asked questions, according to the AP.

All the defendants wore white robes and turbans, and spoke openly with one another throughout the course of the day.

The men, being prosecuted in a special military tribunal for war-time offenses, are charged with conspiring with al-Qaida, attacking civilians and civilian targets, murder in violation of the laws of war, destruction of property, hijacking and terrorism. All five could face the death penalty if convicted.

Associated Press

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged Sept. 11 mastermind, is seen shortly after his capture in Pakistan in this photo taken on March 1, 2003.

The families of people killed in the Sept. 11 attacks were invited to military installations in New Jersey, Massachusetts, Maryland and New York City to watch the pretrial hearings on closed-circuit television, NBCNewYork.com reported.

Getting the terror suspects to this point has been a years-long process mired in political and legal arguments over the defendants' rights, the use of evidence that may have been derived through torture, and the proper venue for the proceedings. The actual trial is expected to be at least a year away.

The pretrial hearings this week will cover a series of motions filed by the various defense teams, dealing primarily with secrecy issues and the detainees' rights.

The most controversial issue, which was not taken up by the end of the first day, is a challenge to the government's gag order on any information gained during interrogation of the detainees. The ACLU and more than one dozen news organizations filed a motion to oppose to government's gag order. The government maintains the order is necessary to protect classified intelligence-gathering techniques.

Defendants may skip hearings
On Monday, prosecutors and lawyers spent hours arguing the most preliminary of issues, including whether the defendants have to be in court at all, with one attorney saying the hearings may dredge up bad memories of their harsh treatment in CIA detention.

Defense attorney Capt. Michael Schwartz argued that the detainees should not be forced to come to court because the process of forcibly removing them from their cells is traumatic and reminiscent of harsh interrogation techniques.

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Schwartz said that if the court was considering forced cell extraction it had to talk about torture.

"No we don't," the judge said quickly.

"I think we do," Schwartz said.

"I'm telling you I don't think that's relevant in this issue. That's the end of that, move on to something else," Pohl retorted.

But Schwartz persisted, saying he needs to address the issue of torture.

"No you don't," the judge said more forcefully this time, adding that the defense does not have the opportunity to make an argument that he sees as irrelevant.

After a prolonged and heated back-and-forth, the detainees were granted the right to waive their attendence at the hearings at least until jurors are assembled for the actual trial, but they must sign a waiver each day they choose not to attend.

Toward the end of the day, the judge asked each of the five detainees a series of questions to ensure they understand their new rights to waive attendance at their sessions.

Binalshibh answered each of his questions in imperfect English, veering into a perplexing discussion about escaping from Guantanamo and alleging unfair treatment from his guards.

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When asked whether he understands that the trial could ultimately continue even if he is not present, Binalshibh looked perplexed, saying, "that is a very wide word, can you be concrete?"

"I'm not implying that I think you are going to escape," the judge said, adding that if that were to happen, the trial could continue without him being there.

"Escaping from custody?" Binalshibh asked.

"I'm not saying you're going to," the judge said, asking again whether he understands that the trial could continue without him. Binalshibh seemed to smile as he said, "Yes I do."

Guantamo guards make things 'difficult'
He raised concerns about the fact that guards would be sent to bring him to the hearings, though, saying, "dealing with the guard is very difficult. They didn't report everything so correctly. Problems with guards can misreporting all things."

"Some guard when you have problem with them they can make it very difficult for us," he said.

When the judge recommended reporting any problems to his attorney, Binalshibh said, "Where can I call him? There is no time to contact him. Very difficult communication for us."

Mohammed answered his questions through his interpreter. He looked down and answered simply "yes" to every question, until at the end when asked whether he understands he doesn't have to attend the sessions.

"Yes, but I don't think there is any justice in this court," he said through his interpreter.

The court was in session for about five total hours, with several breaks throughout the day. It then adjourned until 9 a.m. ET. Tuesday.

Pohl was also expected to hear requests from news organizations on limiting closed courtrooms for secret sessions and be asked to decide whether the U.S. Constitution governs tribunals held at the U.S. base in Cuba.

The testy exchanges occurred during a hearing that was otherwise calm and orderly, in stark contrast to the chaotic 13-hour arraignment hearing in May, when defendants made defiant outbursts and refused to answer the judge's questions or listen through earphones to an Arabic-English translation of the proceedings. In those proceedings, one of the men was briefly restrained and two of them stood up to pray at one point.

Subsequent hearings had been pushed back for various reasons.

A hearing in July was postponed to allow the defendants to observe the holy month of Ramadan. Hearings in August were delayed when an Internet outage left the lawyers unable to access their electronic legal documents. That hearing was later canceled altogether as Tropical Storm Isaac approached. The storm caused no damage to the base.

A hearing scheduled for late September was also delayed because the work space for the defense lawyers was shut down due to a rat infestation and mold, which lawyers claimed were making them sick, Reuters reported.

Pohl ruled on Oct. 5 there would be no further postponements to the hearings.

An earlier attempt to try the five men at Guantanamo ended when the Obama administration tried to move the trials to New York City, where two of the hijacked planes slammed into the World Trade Center.

That was abandoned under pressure from Congress and from New Yorkers, and the charges were re-filed in Guantanamo.

Reuters and The Associated Press contributed to this report. 

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Courtesy Joseph Melrose

Foreign Service veteran Joseph Melrose, who was coordinator for the State Department's post-Sept. 11 Task Force, on a recent trip to Iraq.

Joseph Melrose was for many years the State Department's emergency repairman, having been dispatched to help U.S. diplomatic facilities recover after terrorist attacks, assassinations or civil wars. He is now a professor of international relations and ambassador-in-residence at Ursinus College in Collegeville, Pa., his alma mater. 

Robert Windrem is senior investigative producer for NBC News.

Melrose was coordinator for the State Department's post-Sept. 11 Task Force and  headed the Emergency Support Team deployed to Nairobi, Kenya, after the U.S. Embassy bombings in the late 1990s. He also played roles in the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut after terrorist attacks there in 1983, as well as the evacuation of U.S. diplomatic personnel after an attack on the Karachi consulate.

Melrose spoke to NBC News about how a foreign mission can recover after a catastrophe like the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, last week, in which Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other consulate employees were killed:

For years, you were the State Department's Mr. Fixit, sent to help embassies begin operating again after a terrorist attack or after other hostile actions. What were some of the places you went, and what were the circumstances?

I suppose the two best-known situations are the bombing of our embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 and the bombing of our embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998.  In both cases, there was significant loss of life, but although injured neither Ambassador (Reginald) Bartholomew in Beirut or Ambassador (Prudence) Bushnell were killed. The same day as our Nairobi embassy was bombed, our embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, was also bombed but not as seriously damaged. 

In the Beirut situation, I went in as part of the assessment team and stayed behind to help reestablish embassy operations. In the Nairobi situation I led the Foreign Emergency Response Team which deployed to Kenya. In other situations, such as Freetown, Sierra Leone, which was emerging from a period of virtual civil war, I was already on the ground, and we were able to plan somewhat ahead.

What was the first thing you did when you got word that you were being sent in?

I grabbed some clothes and headed to the airport (Dulles in 1983 and Andrews AFB in 1998) while calling around trying to find out as much as I could about what had happened.

Open Channel: Benghazi emerges as key recruiting ground for al-Qaida, US intel analysts say

What was the first thing you did when you hit the ground?

In Beirut, we arrived at night, so we went to the ambassador's residence and began collecting information. There was shooting that night, and in the morning we went to the embassy to assess the situation on the ground. In Nairobi, we arrived shortly before dawn and went directly to the embassy. 

The first priorities are to make sure that the injured are being cared for, other personnel are safe and to make sure that sensitive material and equipment are not further compromised.

Describe the team that would go in with you — their mission and what they would bring.

Our response to these disasters has evolved, and each one is a bit specific to the situation. In Beirut, it was a small group of State Department officials who went in by commercial aircraft. A State Department M.D., along with several others, met us at the airport and updated us on the injured. Since the situation in Beirut had been volatile for some time, additional security personnel were already on scene. and our main priority was making sure the injured were being taken care of and getting the embassy up and running. In Kenya, an interagency team assembled at Andrews and consisted of State Department personnel, including diplomatic security personnel, military personnel, FBI agents and a team from the Fairfax County (Va.) Urban Search and Rescue Unit, including a German shepherd dog. We also took some emergency medical supplies with us. 

Is there a plan for reconstituting a diplomatic facility? Do you game it, rehearse it?

Yes, there is contingency planning for many possible situations. I assume today there are similar exercises to when I was a Foreign Service officer, but in general, exercises are held at the embassy level to prepare for a potential emergency. I have also participated in training exercises with the Marines, who would be sent to assist in hostile situations which require both additional security and possible evacuations of American personnel. We try our best to prepare for any potential emergency and have general guidelines (or) plans but often the situation on the ground dictates what we do, so there's a need for some flexibility.

How do you secure the embassy and conduct diplomacy during the period?

That would vary with the situation and in large part depends on the current state of relations with the host country, the presence of other embassies to work with and things like communications, the ability to move around and the general environment on the ground. Today, things are much easier than the '80s with technological advances like the Internet and cellphones making communications a lot easier.

What were the differences between reopening a diplomatic facility that had suffered a terrorist attack, like Nairobi, and reopening a facility that had been closed for years, like Freetown in Sierra Leone?

In Beirut and Nairobi, where I was deployed after the event, our embassy was functioning before the event, and our job was to re-establish secure operations at an alternate location and ensure its safety, so that our responsibilities to protect American citizens and carry out relations with the host country can continue.

Freetown, Sierra Leone, was still different. We suspended operations and evacuated the staff following the coup. In 1998, we reopened the embassy, and I was the ambassador assigned to resume operations in Freetown and arrived in November of 1998. The next several weeks saw a resurgence of rebel activity, and in December of that year the U.S. and the U.N. evacuated personnel shortly before the rebels entered the capital city. 

On Christmas Eve, the small American staff and I flew out after we had recommended that Americans and Canadians leave and offered assistance to do that. To protect sensitive information and equipment, we removed hard drives and other equipment and took it with us to Cote d'Ivoire, where we secured it at our embassy. I later went to Conakry, Guinea, where we along with the U.N. set up temporary operations flying in and out as possible until we could go back on a more permanent basis. When we did, it was easy to resume operations. Although the embassy building took a number of RPG hits, only three did major damage, and the building itself was not breached. 

In early 2000, rebels again took up arms, and we evacuated everybody except a security officer and myself, who remained behind until we felt it was safe to bring back the rest of the staff and the humanitarian aid workers.

The major difference between the two situations is the human one. Looking for survivors, ensuring safety, treating the injured, repatriating remains and assessing the psychological trauma inflicted can be emotionally draining and is hard to preplan for. In an emergency response situation, short-term needs take precedence, because time is much more of in issue and things need to be taken care of immediately. But on the plus side, since the embassy was previously up and running, there is much more of a built-in support network to help with the task. 

What were some of the other diplomatic facilities where you were assigned in a crisis situation, and what were the issues you had to deal with in those locations?

When I was assigned to Damascus (1976-80) there were several demonstrations with large crowds in front of the embassy and objects' being thrown at the building. We took precautions, such as dispersing personnel and vehicles, but thankfully they were short-lived, and we were able to resume normal operations quickly. In most if not all of those situations, the demonstrations were organized by the government and did not generally represent the views of the average citizen.

I was also assigned as consul-general and principal officer in Karachi, Pakistan, when President Zia (ul-Haq) and the U.S. ambassador (Arnold Raphel) died in a plane crash, and later when we evacuated most of our personnel and U.S. private citizens at the beginning of the first Gulf War. I stayed in Karachi with a skeleton staff.

What was the most difficult task you faced and why? The most rewarding and why?

That is a hard question to answer — all of these events had different challenges. I guess what was most rewarding is the situation in Sierra Leone today, which has made substantial progress and is now providing personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Secondly, the fact that except for the two bombings in Beirut and Nairobi, there was no loss of life and in those two, additional lives were not lost.

Did you have a deadline and a budget in each case, or were things open-ended, depending on what you found on arrival? Were you in direct contact with the secretary?

I don't remember ever having a deadline per se. Our goal was always to get the job done as quickly as possible. When I was assigned to missions where these kinds of events took place, we did have a budget but that was adjusted as necessary to deal with the event. In the Nairobi and Beirut situations, I did not have a budget and was always given the resources I needed. Resource implications were adjusted as we looked at the potential duration of the problem. For example, when we were out of Freetown, we stayed in a hotel. Had the situation persisted, we may have had to look for a more permanent solution there or another location.

In most of the situations I have referred, to I relied heavily on the undersecretaries for management and political affairs and the relevant assistant secretaries, although Secretary (of State Madeleine) Albright did visit Nairobi after the bombing and Freetown after we had reopened and the situation had stabilized.

In the traumatic aftermath of a terrorist attack, who would be the United States' best partner in reconstituting embassy operations — the host country, friendly nations' diplomats or other U.S. embassies in the region? Or was it a mix?

It is a mix, and it was dependent on the situation. In Sierra Leone, the host country was not in a position to do much, and the only significant diplomatic presence in Freetown besides the U.S. (were) the United Kingdom and the U.N. In Nairobi, the host country and the diplomatic community were in a much better position to assist, but in the end we have to rely heavily on ourselves.

What was it about you, your experience, your skill set that made you the person State turned to? Did you volunteer, or were you selected? Were there others like you? A task force?

I am not sure how to answer. In the Beirut case, the position I held in the Middle East Bureau made me the logical choice. Later on, I guess it was the fact that I had dealt with these situations before … and survived. In the Kenya situation I was asked if I would go, and I said, "Sure." I guess I have volunteered to some extent by taking some of the posts I have held, but it's a bit of being in the wrong places at the wrong time enough that I became a bit of an expert.

In Libya, the ambassador was killed. How does that change things?

Each situation is looked at in its own right. Obviously, removing the person in the key leadership position changes things, but that is why State pays a great deal of attention to assigning people to the No. 2 position (deputy chief of mission) so that he or she can replace the chief of mission when needed as seamlessly as possible. In the case of my assignment to Karachi, Pakistan, I was asked to go because there was concern as to what could happen. When I agreed, the assignment that I then held was curtailed, and I left for Pakistan. I got to Karachi just a very short time before President Zia and the U.S. ambassador (Raphel) were killed in a plane crash. In the Pakistan case, a senior officer was dispatched from Washington to act as charge (d'affaires) given the importance of Pakistan with regard to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan until things could be sorted out.

On 9/11, you were leaving Freetown to return to the U.S. What role did you have in the days and weeks afterwards? How did your experiences in the field help you in that job? 

I left Freetown on 9/11 shortly after the attack on the Twin Towers. We had heard about the attacks. When I got to Paris, U.S. air space had been closed, so I assisted the embassy there. There was a very moving makeshift memorial set up not far from the front of the embassy by Parisians. There were also a number of threats being called in to the Parisian authorities. 

I left Paris on one of the first flights out of Paris to the U.S., and the next day I was walking to State when I was stopped and asked if I would work on the task force. I was asked to chair the midnight-to-8 shift because they wanted somebody senior with both area experience and crisis experience so that they would not wake the principal unnecessarily. I do think my experience both in some of these situations abroad and dealing with others — such as the evacuation of Beirut — from Washington was extremely valuable.

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Updated at 11:57 a.m. ET: GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL BASE, Cuba -- The U.S. has finally started the prosecution of five Guantanamo Bay prisoners charged in the Sept. 11 attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people, but the trial won't be starting anytime soon, and both sides said Sunday that the case could continue for years.

Defense lawyer James Connell said a tentative trial date of May 2013 is a "placeholder" until a true date can be set for the trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the self-described mastermind of the attacks, and his co-defendants.

"It's going to take time," said the chief prosecutor, Army Brig. Gen. Mark Martins, who said he expects to battle a barrage of defense motions before the case goes to trial.

"I am getting ready for hundreds of motions because we want them to shoot everything they can shoot at us," he said in the wake of Saturday's arraignment, which dragged on for 13 hours due to stalling tactics by the defendants.

"Everyone is frustrated by the delay," Martins said. He noted that the civilian trial of convicted Sept. 11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui took four years, and he pleaded guilty in 2006 before being sentenced to life in prison.

Janet Hamlin / AP

In this photo of a sketch by courtroom artist Janet Hamlin and reviewed by the U.S. Department of Defense, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed reads a document during his military hearing at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba, Saturday.

On Saturday, Mohammed and his co-defendants refused to respond to the judge or use the court's translation system and demanded a lengthy reading of the charges. One of them got up and started praying.

Connell called the tactics "peaceful resistance to an unjust system."

The arraignment, Connell said, "demonstrates that this will be a long, hard-fought but peaceful struggle against secrecy, torture and the misguided institution of the military commissions."

The defendants' actions outraged relatives of the victims.

"They're engaging in jihad in a courtroom," said Debra Burlingame, whose brother, Charles, was the pilot of the plane that flew into the Pentagon. She watched the proceeding from Brooklyn on one of the closed-circuit video feeds around the United States.

A handful of those who lost family members in the attacks were selected by a lottery and flown to watch the proceedings at the U.S. naval base in Cuba, where Mohammed and his co-defendants put off their pleas until a later date.

They face 2,976 counts of murder and terrorism in the 2001 attacks that sent hijacked jetliners into New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The charges carry the death penalty.

The detainees' lawyers spent hours questioning the judge, Army Col. James Pohl, about his qualifications to hear the case and suggested their clients were being mistreated at the hearing, in a strategy that could pave the way for future appeals. Mohammed was subjected to a strip search and "inflammatory and unnecessary" treatment before court, said his attorney, David Nevin.

Anonymous / AP

At left a March 1, 2003 photo obtained by the Associated Press shows Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged Sept. 11 mastermind, shortly after his capture during a raid in Pakistan. At right, a photo downloaded from the Arabic language Internet site www.muslm.net and purporting to show a man identified by the Internet site as Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the accused mastermind of the Sep. 11 attacks, is seen in detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

It was the defendants' first appearance in more than three years after stalled efforts to try them for the terror attacks.

The Obama administration renewed plans to try the men at Guantanamo Bay after a bid to try the men in New York City blocks from the trade center site hit political opposition. Officials adopted new rules with Congress that forbade testimony obtained through torture or cruel treatment, and they now say that defendants could be tried as fairly here as in a civilian court.

Nevin said it would be impossible to present testimony against his client that wasn't corrupted by treatment that he says amounted torture. "It's not possible to untaint the evidence any more than it is to unring a bell."

Eddie Bracken of Staten Island, New York, was one of the victims' relatives allowed to attend the hearing, and said it was important to him to see the people accused of killing his sister, Lucy Fishman, a Brooklyn mother of two who worked in the World Trade Center.
He said he came away with impressed with the military justice system, with defense lawyers putting up an aggressive defense.

"If they had done this another country it would have been a different story," Bracken said Sunday. "But this is America."

Human rights groups and defense lawyers say the secrecy of Guantanamo and the military tribunals will make it impossible for the defense. They argued the U.S. kept the case out of civilian court to prevent disclosure of the treatment of prisoners like Mohammed, who was waterboarded 183 times.

Attorney General Eric Holder announced in 2009 that Mohammed and his co-defendants would be tried blocks from the site of the destroyed trade center in downtown Manhattan, but the plan was shelved after New York officials cited huge costs to secure the neighborhood and family opposition to trying the suspects in the U.S.

Congress then blocked the transfer of any prisoners from Guantanamo to the U.S., forcing the Obama administration to refile the charges under a reformed military commission system.

Mohammed, a Pakistani citizen who grew up in Kuwait and attended college in Greensboro, North Carolina, has admitted to military authorities that he was responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks "from A to Z," as well as about 30 other plots, and that he personally killed Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Mohammed was captured in 2003 in Pakistan.

Ramzi Binalshibh was allegedly chosen to be a hijacker but couldn't get a U.S. visa and ended up providing assistance such as finding flight schools. Walid bin Attash, also from Yemen, allegedly ran an al-Qaida training camp in Afghanistan and researched flight simulators and timetables. Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi is a Saudi accused of helping the hijackers with money, Western clothing, traveler's checks and credit cards. Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali, a Pakistani national and nephew of Mohammed, allegedly provided money to the hijackers.

During the failed first effort to prosecute the men at the base in Cuba, Mohammed mocked the tribunal and said he and his co-defendants would plead guilty and welcome execution. The lawyers' statements indicate that plan has changed.

NBC News' Michael Isikoff contributed to this story from The Associated Press.

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Broward Bulldog

Abdulazziz al-Hijji in a photo taken when he lived in Sarasota.

A Saudi man who triggered an FBI investigation after he and his family left their Sarasota, Fla., area home and moved overseas two weeks before 9/11 considered Osama bin Laden a “hero” and may have known some of the hijackers, an informant told the FBI in 2004. 

The informant also told authorities that the Saudi, Abdulazziz al-Hijji, once introduced him to Adnan El Shukrijumah -- another former Florida resident and suspected top al-Qaida operative who today has a $5 million bounty on his head. 

The FBI and the Sarasota County Sheriff’s Office interviewed the informant, Wissam Taysir Hammoud, at the Hillsborough County Jail on April 7, 2004. The Miami-based investigative website Broward Bulldog obtained Florida Department of Law Enforcement reports about the interview and the investigation using the state’s public records law.

Hammoud, 46, who once owned a cell phone business in Sarasota, is serving 21 years in prison after pleading guilty in 2005 in federal court in Tampa to weapons violations and attempting to kill a federal agent and a witness in an earlier case against him. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons classifies him as an “International Terrorist Associate,” court records show.

Al-Hijji’s name made headlines in September 2011 when The Miami Herald reported on a counterterrorism source’s disclosure of a previously unknown FBI-led probe that followed the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington -- one that pointed to a possible Saudi support operation for the hijackers in Florida. 

A decade after the nation’s worst terrorist attack, which claimed the lives of 3,000 people, al-Hijji has now been found to be living in London, where he works for Aramco Overseas, the European subsidiary of Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state oil company. His job title is career counselor. 

'I love the USA'
In an email to London’s Daily Telegraph, which worked on the story with these reporters, al-Hijji acknowledged Hammoud had been his friend, but strongly denied any involvement in the 9/11 plot. 

“I have neither relation nor association with any of those bad people/criminals and the awful crime they did. 9/11 is a crime against the USA and all humankind and I’m very saddened and oppressed by these false allegations,” al-Hijji said. “I love the USA, my kids were born there, I went to college and university there, I spent a good time of my life there and I love it.” 

Al-Hijji’s account is supported by the FBI, which has stated “At no time… did the FBI develop evidence that connected the family members to any of the 9/11 hijackers… and there was no connection to the 9/11 plot.” In response to a Freedom of Information Act request, the FBI repeated this denial as recently as last month. 

In a brief interview outside his office, Al-Hijji also said he did not know Shukrijumah, the alleged al-Qaida operative. “The name doesn’t ring a bell,” he said. 

While living in Florida, al-Hijji attended Manatee Community College (now the State College of Florida Manatee-Sarasota) and, from January 2000 until April 2001, the University of South Florida. He earned a bachelor’s degree with a major in management information systems in August 2001. 

Hasty departure denied
In the weeks before 9/11, al-Hijji -- then 27 -- and his wife, Anoud, daughter of an adviser to a member of the Saudi royal family, departed their home at 4224 Escondito Circle in the upscale gated community of Prestancia and returned to Saudi Arabia.

They left behind three cars and “numerous personal belongings including food, medicine, bills, baby clothing, etc,” according to the Flordia Department of Law Enforcement documents, which state the family departed on Aug. 27, 2001. 

Al-Hijji denied having abandoned his home in haste, explaining: “No, no, no. Absolutely not true. We were trying to secure the (Aramco) job. It was a good opportunity.” He said his wife and children followed him out to Saudi Arabia a few weeks after he left Sarasota. 

After the 9/11 attacks, an alarmed neighbor contacted the FBI. When several weeks passed without action, Prestanica resident and administrator Larry Berberich alerted local law enforcement. Authorities, including the FBI, moved in. 

The investigation led to a stunning development, according to Berberich and a counterterrorism officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity. 

“The car registration numbers of vehicles that had passed through the Prestancia community’s North Gate in the months before 9/11, coupled with the identification documents shown by incoming drivers on request, showed that Mohamed Atta and several of his fellow hijackers – and another Saudi terror suspect still at large – had visited 4224 Escondito Circle on multiple occasions,” the source said. 

AP

Thus undated handout photo provided by the FBI shows alleged al-Qaida operative Adnan Shukrijumah. The U.S. has offered up to $5 million for information leading to his capture.

The others included Marwan al-Shehhi, who plowed a United Airlines jet into the World Trade Center’s South Tower; Ziad Jarrah, who crashed another United jet into a Pennsylvania field; and Walid al-Shehri, who flew with Atta on the first plane to strike the World Trade Center. Also identified as having visited: Saudi-born fugitive Adnan Shukrijumah. 

The source said law enforcement “also conducted a link analysis that tracked phone calls – based on dates, times and length of phone conversations to and from the Escondito house – dating back more than a year before 9/11. And the phone traffic also connected with the 9/11 terrorists – though less directly than the gate logs did.” 

Former U.S. Sen. Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who co-chaired Congress’s bipartisan joint inquiry into the 2001 terrorist attacks, called news of the Sarasota investigation the “most important” development on the background to the 9/11 plot in years. He added that Congress should have been told about it. 

Investigation found no links, FBI says
Soon after the story broke, however, the FBI poured cold water on it. It acknowledged that there had been an investigation, but said it found no connection to the 9/11 plot. It declined to explain. 

The FBI reiterated that position in a letter this month denying a Freedom of Information Act request for records of its investigation. 

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement records suggest such a finding may have been wrong.  One report indicates that what informant Hammoud said during the 2004 interview was treated seriously, “The following information, in particular the information by Wissam Hammoud, is being followed up on internationally,” it said. 

Hillsborough County Jail

Wissam Hammoud.

The FDLE reports buttress key elements of the story, while providing new details.

Hammoud, who said he met al-Hijji through relatives, said the two men worked out together at Shapes Fitness in Sarasota and played soccer at the local Islamic Society.

He told the FBI that al-Hijji was “very well-schooled in Islam” and that “Osama bin Laden was a hero of al-Hijji.” He added that al-Hijji showed him a “website containing information about bin Laden,” and spoke of “going to Afghanistan and becoming a freedom fighter.” Al-Hijji also tried to recruit him, Hammoud said. 

According to Hammoud, al-Hijji also talked of “taking flight training in Venice (Fla.)” He said he believed “al-Hijji had known some of the terrorists from the September 11, 2001 attacks” who were students at an airport there.

Hammoud said al-Hijji “entertained Saudis at his residence” at “parties,” but that he himself did not stay for because – unlike al-Hijji as he remembered him – he “did not drink or smoke cannabis.”

Hammoud also identified Shukrijumah, the alleged al-Qaida operative who also lived in Florida at the time, as a “friend” of al-Hijii’s whom he brought to a soccer game at the Sarasota mosque in 2000 or 2001.

Hammoud’s wife and sister-in-law confirmed during recent interviews that they too knew the al-Hijjis and were familiar with basic elements of Hammoud’s account.

Mrs. Hammoud, who asked that her full name not be used, said she got the impression from comments al-Hijji made that he was “anti-American.” Hammoud himself, speaking from prison in recent days, said al-Hijji “had a lot of hatred towards everyone in America.” He said he had thought al-Hijji was “nuts” when he asked him to go fight in Afghanistan.

A quiet family life asserted
Al-Hijji, while confirming he used to work out with Hammoud, described his life in Sarasota as quiet, centered on his wife and children. 

“My friends were very limited,” he explained. “Normally, I don’t hold parties in the house because I have little kids. I was not a frequent[er] to any bars.” 

Prison officials have put Hammoud under heightened security measures due to his classification as a terrorist associate. Court records state the classification is based on what authorities said was Hammoud’s “support and membership” in a “Palestinian-related terrorist organization.” 

Hammoud denies involvement with the group and has sought -- so far unsuccessfully -- a court order to overturn that classification. While representing himself, he filed documents that reveal a history of mental problems caused by a serious brain injury he suffered in a car accident in 1990. 

After Hammoud’s first conviction in 2002 for selling illegal weapons to an undercover federal agent, an FBI agent wrote: “Hammoud is now claiming diminished capacity because of an auto accident in an effort to be sentenced to less time. …There is speculation on the part of law enforcement that this was merely an attempt to gain sympathy from the sentencing judge.”

Hammoud was found to be competent by a judge before he was allowed to plead guilty to more serious charges arising from his 2004 arrest. The guilty plea and sentence were later upheld on appeal. 

Hammoud’s lawyer, Matthew Farmer, would not comment. But his appellate attorney, Tampa’s Bruce Howie, remembers his former client as “not delusional or wacky. ... I think he has his share of paranoia. But he’s not a liar. He didn’t make it up as he went along.” 

For his part, Hammoud has named several FBI agents that he claims to have dealt with while attempting to assist the government in its fight against terrorism. 

And Hammoud’s current attorney, Detroit’s Sanford Schulman, said FBI agents have met with Hammoud on multiple occasions. 

“There have been about 10 different agents, and that’s just the ones that I’ve been involved with. They were not two-minute meetings either,” said Schulman, who did not attend but was notified of the meetings.

Hammoud may have known more than is revealed in the new FDLE documents.  A Sarasota Herald-Tribune story about him based on an FBI agent’s affidavit filed at the time of Hammoud’s arrest in January 2004 has this ominous reference: 

“In September 2001, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement interviewed Hammoud because someone had anonymously called saying Hammoud had made a comment that the Oklahoma bombing was going to be small compared with what was coming.” 

In a recent email, Hammoud denied having made such a remark.

Anthony Summers is the co-author, with Robbyn Swan, of “The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 & Osama bin Laden.” Dan Christensen edits the Broward Bulldog. This article first appeared in the Broward Bulldog.

Coming Tuesday:Former U.S. Sen. Bob Graham of Florida says classified documents contradict FBI statements.